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Blue Water, Brown Water, and Confederate
Disloyalty: The Peculiar and Personal Naval
Conflict in South Florida during the Civil War
by Irvin D. S. Winsboro and William B. Mack
Florida's political leaders voted on January 10, 1861,
follow the secessionist lead of South Carolina and
ississippi, former Florida Territorial Governor Richard
Keith Call observed the multiple and shifting solidarities of the
state and warned the winning faction that "you have opened the
gates of Hell." Call's premonition swayed few power-brokers in
Tallahassee, yet his words proved prophetic. Only in recent decades
have historians of Florida's Civil War probed past the traditional
interpretations of the state's experience as a "trifling affair" to
establish how disruptive and hellish the conflict was on and to the
home front. Indeed, scholars such as George E. Buker, Robert A.
Taylor, and Tracy J. Revels have opened new and critical windows
onto the internally disruptive aspects of the conflict, especially
upon those men and women seeking to preserve their limited
opportunities in life and the wellbeing of their families. As a result
of the war's miseries, numerous Floridians, particularly those in the
backcountry far removed from the power and privilege of Middle
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Florida (the plantation belt), remained "Union men" or for other
personal reasons abandoned the Confederates and cooperated
with or sought the protection oflocal Union forces. By focusing on
the peculiar blue-brown water naval operations in south Florida,
the following study seeks to add new insight into how the personal
disaffections of various groups of hardscrabble Floridians in that
region influenced the course and conduct of Florida's own "war
within a war." 1
This subject demands examination because the sea-land campaigns of the Federals not only resulted in the fulfillment of military goals and objectives, but also spurred numerous disaffected or
disloyal Confederates of "shifting solidarities" to gravitate to Union
lines as recruits, refugees, informants, and local guides, thus furthering Union goals in unusually critical ways. Generally, historians have viewed these actions in terms of the ebb and flow of
the war in Florida at large but not from the perspective of how
the conflicted populace of the area-the "human factor" -took
advantage of, and by so doing, influenced the sea-land war in south
Florida. Investigating the Union naval campaigns and allied land
forays in south Florida within the context of these types of "bottom
up" actions illuminates peculiar and personal experiences in this
corner of the state that affected the conflict in Florida and to a
larger scale the Civil War.
The Federal blockading fleet that served in Florida contained
a variety of ships ranging from barks, schooners, and sloops to sidewheel and screw steamers. Initially, the blockade fleet was split into
two divisions, the Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Flag Officer
Silas H. Stringham and the Gulf Blockading Squadron under Flag
Officer William Mervine. In January 1862, the blockade forces
were further split into four squadrons, the North and South Atlan-

l.

Herbert J. Doherty Jr., Richard Keith Call: Southern Unionist (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1959), 158; George E. Buker, Blockaders, Refugees,
and Contrabands: Civil War on Florida's Gulf Coast, 1861-1865 (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1993); Robert A. Taylor, Rebel Storehouse: Florida
in the Confederate Economy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,1995);
Tracy J. Revels, Grander in Her Daughters: Florida's Women During the Civil War
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004); Irvin D. S. Winsboro,
ed., Florida s Civil War: Explorations into Conflict, Interpretations and Memory
(Cocoa: Florida Historical Society Press, 2007), especially i-iii, 215-19; Irvin
D. S.Winsboro,"Give Them Their Due: A Reassessment of African Americans
and Union Military Service in Florida During the Civil War," journal of African
American History 92, no. 3 (2007): 327-46.
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tic Blockading Squadrons and the East and West Gulf Blockading
Squadrons. The administration of the blockade of Florida's coastline from Cape Canaveral on the Atlantic coast to a point just east
of Pensacola fell to the East Gulf Blockading Squadron (EGBS).
The lack of rail connections and other infrastructure in Florida
meant that there were no major ports within the operational area
of the EGBS, save Apalachicola and Key West (Union forces held
Key West throughout the war). Tampa Bay and Charlotte Harbor
were recognized as fine natural harbors, but the lack of rail links
to them limited their economic and military potential. Because
the U.S. Navy viewed this area as second- or third-tier operations,
the EGBS often remained lowest on the navy department's list of
priorities for receiving men and ships.
However, the EGBS operated in an unusual environment and
fought the war in unusual ways. The squadron actively encouraged,
supported, and recruited Union sympathizers (Unionists), Confederate apostates (Southerners disappointed by Confederate policies
and demands), Confederate army deserters, and Mrican Americans
(escaped slaves and other blacks who aided the Union in the belief
it would hasten the demise of slavery) along the lower Gulf coast,
where the labor shortage and war fatigue were arguably more acute
than in north Florida. Pockets of Union sympathy existed in other
parts of the Confederacy such as the upland Appalachian regions
of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina, but south Florida
and north Florida differed somewhat from those areas in that the
region was still perceived to be a frontier where outside observers
routinely noted the rugged individualism of its inhabitants. 2 The
cooperation of residents in various war aims and goals in this isolated frontier stimulated the EGBS to undertake a particularly aggressive sea-land campaign, whereas in other theaters blockading forces
more often sought blockade-runners on the open ocean.
In retrospect, the Confederate policies of conscription, impressment, and agricultural levies actually enhanced the EGBS's efforts to
turn Rebel forces and loyalties in the eastern Gulf to its advantage.
2.

For the historiography on the Civil War in Tennessee and North Carolina,
see Noel Fisher, War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East
Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997);
Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South,
1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); andjohn C.
Inscoe, and Gordon McKinney The Heart of Confederate Appalachia: Western North
Carolina in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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Unlike most of the state, there were also a number of refugee camps
composed mainly of disaffected white settlers and fisher folk along
the lower coastline of Florida, most notably at Egmont Key at the
mouth of Tampa Bay and at Useppa Island near Charlotte Harbor.
The EGBS routinely supplied these camps, whose refugees constituted a main source of intelligence about Confederate activity and
provided recruits familiar with the local waterways. In the long run,
Confederate policies in frontier south Florida drove sizable numbers
of residents to seek refuge with the Federals, taking with them muchneeded manpower and local knowledge that made the Union naval
and land forces more effective in the theater.
Seizure of agricultural staples for the Confederate army particularly provoked locals in this region of the state. Reports recorded
in the voluminous Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
link the hardship brought about by the seizure of beef and other
agricultural products directly to the rate of Confederate desertion
in Florida. Many of these soldiers not only deserted the Confederate Army but also added their arms and knowledge to Union forces.
Florida Governor John Milton reported, "The effect of the impressments ... was the desertion of a large number of the troops ...
who, indignant at the heartless treatment of the rights of citizens,
have joined the enemy." Milton requested that orders be issued
forbidding interference with cows, calves and stock not fit for military beef and requiring civilian impressment agents to receive military rank to legitimize their status. Milton added, "I have reason to
know that lawless and wicked conduct of Government agents in this
State have produced serious dissatisfaction among the troops from
this State ... and unless the evils complained of shall be promptly
remedied the worst results may reasonably be apprehended." 3
A lack of manpower plagued the Confederacy throughout its
existence. This problem was exacerbated by Confederate conscription policy, which particularly riled the hardscrabble fishermen
and farmers in remote south Florida. Conscript officers found
it difficult to balance the need for new soldiers with the need to
maintain a productive force of agricultural workers. During the
war, Governor Milton wrote to Jefferson Davis:

3.

John Milton to James A Seddon, January 26, 1964, U.S. War Department, War
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies, ser. 4, vol III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1880-1901), 45-46. Hereafter cited as OR
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It is with the utmost difficulty and most active exertions
that the families of soldiers now in the Confederate service can be saved from starvation in many portions of this
State; and I do not hesitate to say that if all [men] between
the ages alluded to [18-45], and now engaged in agriculture, shall be called into camps of instruction that it will be
utterly impossible to save the poor of the State from starvation the next year, even if it be possible to do so during the
current year. 4
The governor expressed his belief that there was little need for
additional troops to defend the state and that agricultural workers should remain in the fields if at all possible. Milton made no
presumptions as to the need for conscript replacements in other
theaters, though he was aware of the unpopularity of the removal
of state troops among the citizenry. The Commandant of Conscription for the state, Colonel William Miller, supported the governor's position. Miller noted the particular resentment in south
Florida inasmuch as that region was an economic backwater of the
state, which, consequently, had a peculiar need to produce its own
subsistence. 5 In this case, Richmond acquiesced to the governor's
plea; however, in most cases the need for fresh troops trumped all
appeals, leaving wives and children to fend for themselves.
Moreover, many of the local fishermen and "crackers" of south
Florida had fought alongside Union troops during the recent Seminole War and manifested no discernible support for secession.
The Confederate command took a dim view of such men. As one
Seminole War veteran noted about the notion that Union men and
sympathizers could remain above the fray in south Florida, "What a
delusion!" One Federal commander observed early in the conflict,
"Union men they threaten to hang, and do shoot, as we have lamentable proof. "6 While calculated to result in service and loyalty,
these Confederate policies actually had the effect of convincing a
number of men in south Florida that the only way to protect fam4.
5.
6.

John Milton to Jefferson Davis, May 7, 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. LIII, 347-48.
Ibid.; William Miller to C. B. Duffield, May 7, 1864, ORN, ser. 1, vol. LIII, 34849.
John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1963), 161 ; J.C. Howell to Gideon Wells, September 3, 1862, U.S. Navy
Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the
Rebellion, ser. 1, vol. 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1891-1927) , 309. Hereafter cited as ORN.
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ily and to secure provisions was to move toward Union spheres of
influence. Predictably, south Florida became contested ground
. between settlers of both stripes. As noted by one contemporary of
these events, "in fact, it was a war distinct from the real war. They
[south Floridians] had a war among themselves." 7 This looming
reality led many men in the wilderness of the lower peninsula to
question or jettison their Confederate loyalties as the more pressing local concerns of family and livelihood moved to the forefront
of their worldview. Union naval and contingent land forces on the
lower Gulf Coast perceptively reached out to such men (estimated
to be up to 800) in efforts to undermine Confederate morale and
effectiveness in the southern tier of Florida. 8 For the Confederate
command, the Union efforts proved all too successful.
In September 1861, the Union navy implemented plans to
blockade and disrupt the Confederate coastline, including the
unusually long and porous coastline of south Florida. Union naval
commanders noted that the Florida Keys commanded ingress
and egress to and from the Confederate states ringing the Gulf
of Mexico. Upon closer examination of the region, the U.S. Navy
concluded that Forts Taylor and jefferson, in Key West and the Dry
Tortugas respectively, could secure their duty area "against any but
a first-rate naval power." It was noted that holding these positions
ensured the control of commerce and the wrecking and salvage
industry, and the operation of an admiralty court in the region.
Military records disclose that the navy noted the potential for
actions at the two "beautiful bays" at Charlotte Harbor and Tampa
and that Cedar Key, while inferior as a natural harbor, took on
added significance because of its rail link. The navy's early plans
called for garrisoned forts at each of these points and "one or more
gunboats plying up and down the coast, with the occasional call of
supply vessels." 9

7.

8.

9.

F.C.M. Boggess, A Veteran of Four Wars: The Autobiography of F.C.M. Boggess, A
Record of Pioneer Life and Adventure and Heretofore Unwritten History of the Florida
Seminole Indian War (Arcadia, FL: Champion jobs Room, 1900) , 69.
Report by General Woodbury, December 14, 1863, in Samuel Proctor, ed. ,
"Florida A Hundred Years Ago" (Coral Gables, FL: Florida Library and
Historical Commission, and Civil War Centennial Committee, 1965) , 3.
Second Report Conference for the Consideration of Measures for Effectually
Blockading the Coast Bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, September 3, 1861,
ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVI, 651-54.
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Over the course of the war, this plan proved inadequate because
it projected only open-ocean "blue water" operations along the
island and inlet-dotted "brown water" coast of south Florida. The
Federal navy had acknowledged the numerous barrier islands and
the brown-water bays and inlets along the irregular and broken
coastline of the region but failed early in the conflict to recognize
the haven they would offer for "wildcat" blockade-runners and for
disaffected Confederates and local Unionists. By 1862, the so-called
wildcat runners regularly avoided the large, deep-draft, blue water
blockading vessels by traveling south through the brown-water network of the Gulf coast in small, shallow-draft vessels before making a dash to Havana or Nassau, where they would offload cargo
and onload lucrative staples to unload back in Florida. The brown
waterways along the Gulf coast proved especially advantageous to
these agents of contraband, as the exceptionally high number of
barrier islands, creeks, and river mouths offered concealment that
often allowed them to slip past the Union blockaders unnoticed.
This soon confounded the local contingent of the Union navy.
As early as July 1861, Union commanders recognized that a
new strategy and ship deployment were needed in the lower Gulf
region to interdict the contraband trade of the coastline's blockade-runners. Flag officer William Mervine, who commanded the
Gulf squadron prior to its split, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy,
"I beg leave to suggest, sir, that in order to establish a rigid blockade, it will be absolutely necessary to employ small steam vessels
of light draft to cruise in the shoal water and numerous inlets on
the coasts of Florida ... where a large coasting trade is carried on,
beyond the reach of our heavy vessels." 10 This request was not, however, acted upon for some time because of the navy department's
persistent low-priority status for this region. By 1862, blockade running in south Florida had increased to the point that Federal commanders could no longer ignore the significance of the illicit trade
in the lower Gulf.
As a result, the irregular coastline of south Florida and the
economically marginal fisher folk and agrarians who inhabited the
region lost their advantage of isolation and became new pawns in
the war. Moreover, new Union intelligence disclosed that numerous Union sympathizers, conscription evaders, and other Confed-

10.

William Mervine to Gideon Welles,July 1, 1861, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVI, 565.
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erate "layouts" inhabited the coastline and inland areas and might
be persuaded to the Northern cause if its forces assumed a more
aggressive presence there. In his report on the subject, Mervine
suggested, "a sufficient force to effectually blockade the coast
[that] would give quite enough employment to a separate command."11 Thus, as the Union forces in south Florida faced yet a
second year of service in the inhospitable environs of the east Gulf,
they assumed a new strategy and profile based on the realization
that human factors there might well be turned to their advantage.
The Tampa Bay area offered a particularly instructive example of how the Union sought to implement its new strategy. Even
though Confederate sentiment in Tampa was generally strong,
many locals resented Confederate policy and remained loyal in
spirit to the North. One such person who gravitated to the Union
for this very reason was John Whithurst, who lived on the bay some
eight to ten miles from Tampa. He sought the protection of the
Union bark Ethan Allen in early 1862, "stating that he was in fear
for his life from the secessionists at Tampa, for the reason that he
refused to join the Southern Army and had expressed his intention of fighting for no flag but the one he was brought up and
had always lived under." 12 Lieutenant William Eaton of the Ethan
Allen reported that Whithurst and "some thirty-eight of his neighbors and friends ... are Union men, and have positively refused to
render any aid to the secession cause, for which reason they have
suffered every possible persecution and have lost much of their
property." 13
Before contacting the navy, Whithurst had gathered intelligence on blockade running and Confederate activities around
Tampa Bay. It is likely he did so out of a desire to impress Eaton
with his potential as an intelligence operative and to prove that
he was not a Confederate spy. He informed the blockaders as to
the position and armament of the shore battery protecting Tampa
and the entrance to the Hillsboro River, the size and morale of
the Confederate force occupying the town, and the location of the
equipment removed by Rebels needed to make the lighthouse on

11. Ibid.
12. William B. Eaton to William W. McKean, January 18, 1862, ORN, ser. 1,
vol. XVII, 84-86. In another report, Whithurst is erroneously referred to as
"Whitehurst."
13. Ibid.
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Egmont Key operative once again. Whithurst also collected information on the nine blockade-runners in the bay and shared knowledge useful for navigation of the brown-water channels that runners
frequented. As Eaton reported, "provisions of all kinds are scarce
and high in Tampa and throughout Florida, and large numbers of
the people are beginning to become disgusted with so hopeless a
struggle ... Mr. Whithurst gave me some very timely information."
Whithurst also directed Eaton to another non-aligned comrade,
Frank Girard, a pilot with twenty-five years of experience and "intimate knowledge of all the channels and of the whole bay." Girard
volunteered to act as a pilot if called upon and stated that he could
guide the Ethan Allen to the gateway of Tampa. In his report, Eaton
also noted the "utter destitution" of residents in the area. 14
On February 17, Whithurst's intelligence culminated in a raid
to "cut out" blockade-runners in the Tampa area. The Ethan Allen,
while towing the sloop Mary Nevis, attempted to contact and secure
the services of Girard as pilot for the raid. Due to heavy surf, the
Union raiders were unable to cross the bar at Bayes Pass to reach
Girard's home and were thus compelled to wait until daybreak.
The fact that they had delayed their attack in order to secure Girard
as a pilot suggests the importance naval officers placed on local
residents' knowledge. In the Union commander's mind, Girard's
services were needed for success because the pass was "very narrow
and extremely difficult of access, except to a person who is well
acquainted with the passage." 15
Even with Girard piloting the ship, the passage proved treacherous. The Ethan Allen crossed the bar but the Mary Nevis grounded. Whithurst and two sailors were left aboard the grounded sloop
while the Ethan Allen proceeded and captured a schooner and two
unoccupied sloops, presumably enemy vessels. Being left aboard
the grounded Mary Nevis implies that Whithurst had now gained
the full trust of the Union blockaders. Even though it had only
been one month since he first made contact with the navy, the
fact that he was given such responsibility suggests his value to local
naval operations. Mter recrossing the bar, two of the prize vessels
grounded and remained there until the next high tide. The vessels later proceeded to the mouth of Tampa Bay, where they took

:... ·

14.
15.

Ibid.
George W. Frost to William B. Eaton, February 21, 1862, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
132-33.
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Whithurst's family and a few other like-minded people on board
for transport to a new Union camp at Egmont Key for refugees and
others who had forsaken the Confederate cause for personal reasons.1 6 A camp similar to the one on Egmont Key was later established farther south on Useppa Island near Charlotte Harbor.
In the Ethan Allen action, the Federals relied heavily on the
services of local Union sympathizers. As General David P. Woodbury, Commander of the U.S. Army's Department of the Gulf,
noted in his correspondence on the subject, "Mr. Girard ... the
·pilot, showed himself to be a true man, and by his ready willingness to do anything in his power, proved his loyalty to the Union.
We were bountifully supplied by Mr. Griner, another Union man,
with such provisions as they had to give us, and had it not been for
16.

Ibid.
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[them] we should have suffered from want of food. "17 It was not
unusual for blockaders to acquire supplies from farmers near the
<;:oast. The presence of the navy offered a local market for farmers,
cattlemen, and fishermen who otherwise might not have been able
to sell or trade their produce. Late in the war, the Union reoccupied the former Seminole War installation at Fort Myers, partly to
supply beef to blockaders and deprive the enemy of the foodstuff
as well. It should also be noted that the Official Records disclose
little about the planning of cutting out parties. The fact that many
Union actions succeeded with little planning may be indicative of
the quality and timeliness of intelligence and provisions supplied
by the local refugees and escaped slaves.
By the fall of 1862, the Union had consolidated its position
in south Florida and began construction on a battery at Egmont
Key. The installation included three 8-10 pound cannons which
the Union located there in attempts to seal Tampa Bay from current and future blockade-running. The island soon offered haven
for people of pro-Union sentiment like Whithurst. The island's
new inhabitants of dislocated south Floridians looked to the Union
forces to supply their needs and to protect them from Confederate
raids and reprisals. 18 In return, they provided intelligence on Confederate activities and local water routes and also served as a pool
of recruits for active or temporary Union service.
Even with the protection and provisions supplied by the navy,
Whithurst and his compatriots could not meet their needs without
returning to the mainland to gather crops, thus exposing themselves to Confederate reprisals. On one such trip, Rebels ambushed
John and Scott Whithurst as they departed the mainland to return
to Egmont Key with potatoes and beef. Scott Whithurst suffered
mortal wounds and John Whithurst sustained critical wounds, but
nevertheless managed to pull his boat out of the fire. Whithurst lay
wounded in his boat and drifted in Tampa Bay for two days. The
Union vessel Tahoma eventually rescued him, but he died shortly
thereafter. Whithurst's last wishes were that his three sons, all of
them younger than thirteen, would someday join the Union navy. 19
Ibid, 134; Daniel P. Woodbury to Charles P. Stone, December 17, 1863, OR, ser.
I, vol. XXVI, pt. I, 874-75; Daniel P. Woodbury to Charles P. Stone, January 22,
1864, OR, ser.l, vol. XXXV, pt.l , 460-61.
18. "Egmont Key Occupied by Union Troops," New York Times, August 15, 1861;
"West Coast of Florida," New York Times, November 17, 1862.
19. J.C. Howell to Gideon Welles, September 3, 1862, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 309;
Buker, Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands, 33.
17.
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Tampan Henry A. Crane's Civil War career is perhaps the best
example of a Confederate turned Union sympathizer, who rose
from the bottom to contribute to the war effort in the expanses of
south Florida. Crane had served in the Seminole War and edited
a Tampa newspaper in the antebellum period. With the outbreak
of hostilities, Crane initially joined a Confederate-aligned home
guard unit but switched allegiances in late 1862. Historian George
E. Buker contends that Crane's support for the Confederacy waned
after his compatriot from the Seminole War, the previously mentioned John Whithurst, and his son were slain by Confederates for
their support of the Union . Crane would later prove to be a valuable asset to the Union forces as he rose through the ranks in this
theater of the war. 20
Crane gathered like-minded neighbors from the Tampa area
and set out across the lower peninsula for the Indian River, where
he recruited a few locals and waited for a blockade vessel to appear.
He then presented himself to the captain of the USS Sagamore and
offered his services. He was taken to Key West, where he proposed
a plan to Admiral Theodorus Bailey to cut out blockade runners
using the Indian and St. Johns River systems to offload goods smuggled from the Bahamas. Bailey endorsed the plan, made Crane and
his compatriots supernumerary volunteers, and ordered the Sagamore to transport them back to the Indian River, allowing Crane the
use of a boat to complete the mission. Crane's men provided their
own arms in order to remain less conspicuous, for they planned
to sail up the brown water into enemy territory to capture prize
vessels. The trip would have required travel through Confederate
territory for an extendt:d period of time. 21
Crane's party set out on January 3, 1863, and soon captured
a number of enemy craft. Reaching Indian River Narrows after
dark, Crane's men captured the schooner Pride out of Nassau.
They destroyed its contraband cargo of 188 bushels of salt. Crane
returned to the mouth of the river with his prize and its crew as
prisoners and turned them over to the U.S. bark Gem of the Sea.
Crane set out again, this time accompanied by a small cutting out

20.
21.

Buker, Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands, 60-61.
Theodorus Bailey to Earl English,January 2, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, val. XVII, 34445; Earl English to Henry A. Crane,January 3, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, val. XVII, 345;
Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles, March 10, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, val. XVII,
369-70.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol90/iss1/5

12

Winsboro: Blue Water, Brown Water, and Confederate Disloyalty: The Peculiar

46

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

party from the Gem of the Sea. He captured a small boat and two
Rebel spies on January 7, and destroyed the unmanned enemy
schooner Flying Cloud at St. Lucie River two days later. On the 16th,
Crane's men destroyed 45 sacks of salt at a nearby location and captured two men in a small boat the next day. The following day they
destroyed 4 bales of cotton and 130 bushels of salt near Jupiter. 22
On January 23, Crane and his men spotted a Rebel schooner
sailing downriver and concluded from the number of men on board
that they were planning to attack a U.S. Navy ship at the mouth
of the river. Under cover, Crane and his party waited until midnight to mask their disparity of manpower and "pounced suddenly
upon them," surprising and capturing the schooner's crew. Almost
immediately, Crane spotted an unmanned lighter and captured it
as well. Crane now had twelve prisoners, but only seven men to
sail three boats. Fearing that the prisoners might overpower his
small party, Crane placed two men aboard the captured lighter and
placed the prisoners aboard his own boat with two armed men and
towed it behind the prize schooner, which he manned with his two
remaining men. This limited his party's exposure and allowed the
two men aboard the boat to keep their weapons covering the prisoners at all times. On January 28, much to the Union Command's
satisfaction, Crane delivered his prize vessels and prisoners to the
Gem of the Sea at the mouth of the Indian River. 23
Admiral Bailey felt newly empowered by Crane's success and
reported to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, that he had
curtailed blockade running from the Indian River on the lower
Florida coastline. He wrote Welles that Crane and his followers,
"have been of efficient service in clearing out the Rebels from
Indian River and in breaking up their connection with the lawless
traders of Nassau; and it is scarcely too much to say that without
the local knowledge and personal acquaintance possessed by these
22.

23.

Henry A. Crane to Earl English, February 7, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
363-64. Salt was an essential commodity for the preservation of foodstuffs in
the days before refrigeration. It was in short supply in the Confederacy and
therefore was a profitable import for blockade-runners.
"How to Dispose of Prisoners," New York Times, March 29, 1863. This article
was written by a correspondent aboard the Gem of the Sea and, even though
somewhat confusing as to the disposition of the prisoners to boats and arms,
this explanation makes the most sense to the authors. Buker, Blockaders,
Refugees, and Contrabands, 62-63; Henry A. Crane to Earl English, February 7,
1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 363-64; Henry A. Crane to Earl English, March 4,
1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 372-73.
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men it would have been nearly impossible to effect this very desirable object." 24 Bailey would thereafter focus his forces on the lower
Gulf and routinely factor into his strategy the particular usefulness
of such disaffected Confederates. Indeed, blue water, brown water,
and local Union sympathizers and refugees would now become a
central theme of the conduct of the war in the lower peninsula.
Bailey in short order commissioned Crane as a Volunteer Acting Master's Mate aboard the Sagamore and transferred him along
with the ship to the lower, east Gulf coast, where he nettled the
local Confederates by leading shore party raids and attracting substantial numbers of disaffected locals. Per military records, the
success of Crane's raids on both coasts of south Florida notably
increased the credibility of citizen-supplied intelligence and abilities in the minds of Union leaders. "Union men" and Confederate
layouts now moved to the core of the Federal's plans to interdict
blockade running and Confederate supply lines in south Florida.
Moreover, Union commanders increasingly recognized the ability
of such men and their presence in the lower peninsula to attract
blacks to the Northern cause and away from labor contributions
to the enemy. Although little discussed in the literature, this new
black service included not only army actions but also enlistments in
and service to the Northern navy.
While scholars have documented the black contribution to the
U.S. Army in Florida, few have noted the rich story of black seamen
in the state. In reality, a number of freedom-seeking blacks-mainly former bondsmen-gravitated to the U.S. Navy in the east Gulf
region out of their desire to cripple the enemy, to end slavery, and
to prove their mettle under fire.
Unlike the segregated Northern army, black sailors often served
alongside whites aboard ship. The navy offered higher pay than the
army and the chance for blacks to serve in a more meaningful service
than the construction and labor work routinely assigned to them in
the army. Mrican-American sailors comprised about 20 percent of
total Union navy strength during the war, or nearly 19,000 men who
offered valuable service to their comrades at sea. 25
24.
25.

Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles, March 10, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
369-70.
Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies: The Civil War Afloat (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 7-8: Barbara B. Tomblin, Bluejackets and
Contrabands: African Americans and the Union Navy (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 2009), 147.
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Naval vessels encountered an increasing number of escaped
slaves, commonly referred to as "contrabands," during the early
war years. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles determined that
they could not be sent back to their masters nor could they be compelled to work without compensation, so he authorized commanders on the blue water to enlist contrabands into the service "under
the same form and regulations as apply to other enlistments." Contrabands quickly signed up for the Union navy and offered valuable service, but were allowed no higher rating than "boys" (cabin
boys). Even so, newly enlisted contrabands helped to fill the labor
shortage of the bluejackets at sea by mid-1862, and this included
service in or near Florida waters. 26 Of the 255 black sailors from
Florida, most appeared in the records as former slaves or farmers, but thirteen were recorded as tradesmen (the preponderance
as carpenters) and ten were enumerated as watermen or as once
having served in related occupations. Enlistment ages ranged
from fourteen to sixty. 27 Although data on contraband enlistees
in the Official Records remain relatively scarce, naval records in the
National Archives in Washington, D.C. disclose that many of the
black sailors enlisting in the Union navy (usually mustered in as
former farmers) did so in actions and aboard ships in south Florida
(although the majority of Florida slaves resided in the slave belt of
the panhandle). Once the Union navy established itself as a permanent presence along the coast of south Florida, bondsmen in or
brought to the area certainly must have recognized its presence as
a beacon to freedom and an opportunity to serve their own "special
cause" of destroying slavery.
Little detail on contraband enlistees' actual engagements is
in the Official Records. For instance, a typical entry reads, "On
the 30th [of July, 1863] Jacob Parker (contraband) came off to
this ship and I have shipped him." 28 By September 1862, naval
officers were informed that Congress had passed a law forbidding
the return of contrabands. They were instead instructed to enter

26.

27.

28.

Gideon Welles to William W. McKean, September 25, 1861 , ORN, ser. 1, vol.
XVI, 689; Gideon Welles to James L. Lardner and David G. Farragut, July 2,
1862, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 269.
Figures and percentages derived from National Park Service, Civil War
Soldiers and Sailors System, Mrican-American Sailors in the Civil War Project,
in conjunction with Howard University, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Charles L. Willcomb to Theordorus Bailey,July 31 , 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
523.
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only the name of the slave and that of the owner or claimant into
the ship's log.
More detailed information was sometimes communicated
when contrabands supplied timely intelligence. Indeed, their
information was often explicit and valuable. The captain of the
USS Ethan Allen reported that two contrabands informed him that
"the schooner Kain lay 8 miles up the ... Bay. Her cargo of cotton had been discharged [and the] schooner has been stripped of
all light spars, sails, and rigging, and lay at anchor in the stream
with nothing on board. Lower masts and bowsprit standing." 29
George, another self-liberated bondsman formerly belonging to
one Eli Ramsey, reportedly traveled seventy miles from the interior
and made contact with the USS Tahoma on February 14, 1862. He
informed the crew that 400 Confederates occupied Way Key and
that a train had recently arrived bearing a heavy gun. George may
have been sent back to reconnoiter the island, since on February
19, he reported that the enemy had deserted the key. 30
Although the trade had been outlawed by Washington, anumber of slave ships were captured prior to and during the war. In
the spring of 1860, the USS Mohawk overtook the slaver Wildfire
and towed it into Key West, where its 350 captives were quartered
in special barracks until they could be returned to Mrica. The
Mohawk captured four more slave ships bearing 530 Mricans off
the north coast of Cuba in 1861. Another ship, captured in June
1862, had reportedly landed 750 slaves before being overhauled
by a Union navy vessel. The report did not specify whether the
slaves landed in Florida or Cuba, but similar reports often suggested an ongoing illicit slave trade between Cuba and the peninsula.
In the late summer of 1861, an informant reported to a Union
officer that a slaver ship/ privateer was outfitted and ready to sail
from its berth twelve miles up the Caloosahatchee River as soon
as it received its complement and Confederate letters of marque.
In the summer of 1862, the USS Amanda captured a "slave prize"

29.

Charles L. Willcomb to Theodorus Bailey, July 31 , 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
523;J.C. Howell to William W. McKean , February (no date) 1862, ORN, ser. 1,
vol. XVII, 135-36; S.F. DuPont to C. Steedman, September 15, 1862, ORN, ser.
1, vol. XIII, 327-28; I.A. Pennell to Theodorus Bailey, February 7, 1863, ORN,
ser. 1, vol. XVII, 363.
30. J.C. Howell to William W. McKean, February (no date) 1862, ORN, ser. 1, vol.
XVII, 134-36.
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in south Florida waters. 31 Given its long and porous coastline, its
proximity to Cuba and Caribbean slave ports, and the Southern
need to fulfill its labor shortage through any means possible, black
sailors of the EGBS must have derived a special pride from identifying and capturing ships with illegal human cargo. Moreover,
black service in their own special cause and the larger Union cause
arguably provided a sort of "middle passage" from slave to citizen
based on their wartime experiences, including those present as
the war dragged on in Confederate and non-Confederate south
Florida. Throughout much of this action, Union conventional and
unconventional efforts, in conjunction with local Unionists, sympathizers, refugees, African-Americans, and Confederate turncoats
would come to characterize the war on the local blue and brown
waters, especially in regard to crippling or ending Confederate and
privateer blockade running.
Naval officers learned in October 1863 that two blockaderunners, the steamer Scottish Chief and the sloop Kate Dale, were
taking on cotton and preparing to run the blockade from the Hillsboro River near Tampa. Concerned that they would escape the
blockaders due to their light draft, the Union officers decided to
destroy them where they were fitting-out in the river. On the 16th,
the Tahoma and Adela ran abreast of the battery protecting Tampa
and shelled it to divert attention from the real object of the expedition. That night a cutting out party, consisting of sixty men from
the Tahoma and forty from the Adela, and under the command of
Acting Master T. R. Harris and with Henry Crane and]. A. Thompson as local scouts, landed at Ballast Point where they traveled
on foot to where the ships were located and engaged them. The
whereabouts of the blockade-runners was probably provided by the
Union recruit Thompson, since his worth to their cause was proved
31.

-:-··

"The Mricans of the Slave Bark 'Wildfire,"' Harper's Weekly, June 2, 1860,
344-46; "Arrival of the Mohawk," New York Times, February 8, 1861; William
H. French to William W. McKean, July 20, 1861 , ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVI, 592;
Emily Holder, "At the Dry Tortugas During the War: A Lady's Journal," The
Californian Illustrated (February 1892), 183; N. Goodwin to]. L. Lardner,June
18, 1862, and Joseph E. Jones to N. Goodwin, June 18, 1862, ORN, ser. 1,
vol. XVII, 265-66; "From Key West," New York Times, June 29, 1862; William
Mervine to Gideon Welles, August 17, 1861 , ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVI, 638-40 (the
second report states the ship in the Caloosahatchee was a privateer); James
Mooney, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Washington, DC: Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, 1969), vol. 4, 408; Paul
Silverstone, Warships of the Civil War Navies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1989) , 93.
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by their carrying him on a litter throughout the fourteen-mile
march. Whether or not Thompson supplied the intelligence, it is
dear that his presence was considered vital to the mission because
Harris deemed it necessary to bear the non-ambulatory Thompson
into enemy territory.
At daybreak on the 17th, Harris discovered the Scottish Chief
and Kate Dale on the opposite bank of the river. The shore party
moved parallel to the ships, took them under aim, and hailed the
unsuspecting crew. They ordered boats to their bank; during the
crossing, two of the blockade-runner's crew escaped and alerted a
nearby Confederate garrison. Both vessels were destroyed along
with the 167 bales of cotton they contained as the shore parties
returned to their ships. The sailors encountered several armed
parties near their embarkation point, charged, and captured two
prisoners. 32
While waiting for the arrival of the Tahoma's boats, a mixed unit
of Confederate cavalry and infantry advanced. As two-thirds of the
shore party embarked on the boats, the Confederates, estimated
to be seventy to eighty in number, opened fire. The remaining
sailors spread out to avoid presenting a mass target and returned
fire, while the Adela shelled the woods in which the Rebels secreted
themselves. The remainder of the shore party defended itself for
fifteen to twenty minutes: "This rear guard stood nobly to their
post, protecting the retreat under an extremely severe fire from a
concealed enemy-loading and firing with the coolness of target
practice, and finally leaving quietly at the word of command, bearing with them their wounded." 33
In this action, the Union suffered three killed, ten wounded,
and five taken prisoner. The wounded were taken to the Federal
camp at Egmont Key, where the Tahoma s surgeon treated them.
The Confederate casualties were six killed in addition to the five
blockade-runners and two soldiers who were transported to the
Tahoma as prisoners. The Rebel commander, James Westcott, stated that the sailors who had been killed on shore fought so bravely
that he intended to give them the best funeral he could provide.

32.

Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles, October 24, 1863, ORN, ser.l vol. XVII,
570-72; "The War in Florida," New York Times, November 12, 1863.
33. Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles, October 24, 1863, ORN, ser.l vol. XVII,
570-72; Thomas R. Harris to A. A. Semmes, October 18, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol.
XVII, 574-76.
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Both the Tahoma and Adela crews raised cash to help their captured
shipmates pay their way through "Dixie." 34
Casualties notwithstanding, Admiral Bailey praised the results
of the expedition. He called it a "brilliant little affair" and believed
it was typical of the similar actions that would demoralize or otherwise disrupt the Rebel blockade-runners. He wrote, "The lesson
taught to the Rebels by this expedition, that their movements can
be watched and thwarted by the daring of our seamen, even when
carried on at a distance of several miles up a river whose mouth
is protected by a fortified town, is of no small importance, and is
calculated to depress them in proportion to the audacity and discipline displayed by our men." Union converts Crane and Thompson were described as "excellent" guides, and Crane was praised for
"gallant conduct" by the commanding officer of the expedition.35
The presence of such local guides must have added some measure
of assurance for the other men during a raid in enemy territory.
They would have avoided going astray, known where to find help
if needed, and they would also have known of areas and people to
avoid. This knowledge further solidified the Union commanders'
positive view of the service of south Florida personnel, both in the
field and upon the extensive blue and brown waters of the region.
For residents of the lower east Gulf who made their living on
those waters, life during the war proved difficult. Confederate officials were wary of contact between the fishing fleet and blockaders.
By 1862, the Rebel commander at Tampa, Major W.L.L. Bowen,
had determined to "break up the nefarious trade and communication" between fishermen and the blockading force. He chartered
and armed a local ship with a six-pound gun and set about harassing the fishing fleet. Within a few weeks, he had captured nine
smacks and three schooners. Sixty-eight prisoners, "some Yankees .
. . some Key Westers," were taken to Tampa. Even after the blockade was well established, the broken coastline made it difficult for
the navy to protect friendly fishing operations. In December of
1862, the oyster schooner Charles Henry was fishing in Pine Island
Sound south of Charlotte Harbor when pursued by a "Rebel sloop
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of very light draft, having five men aboard." The captain and mate
of the Charles Henry ran ashore on Pine Island and escaped to the
home of a friend who alerted the captain of the USS Penguin. Two
armed boats from the Penguin spotted and pursued the Rebels but
lost them among the innumerable islands and shoals during the
night. They were able to salvage the Charles Henry even though the
Confederates had scuttled it. 36 Once again, Florida locals of various backgrounds and dedications were able to turn the tide of the
clash in favor of the Federal forces.
As the war progressed, blockade running evolved into a private
enterprise with runners preferring cargo that returned a quick,
handsome profit. Outbound cargoes such as cotton or turpentine
from the lower peninsula were sold or exchanged in Havana or
Nassau for scarce wartime goods such as liquor or coffee that could
be sold at enormous markups at home. Necessities such as salt and
valuable commodities like coal also commanded high prices. For
instance, blacksmith's coal that could be acquired for $20 per ton
in Nassau or Havana sold for $500 per ton in the Confederacy. 37
Although engaged in risky business, blockade-runners pursued
such profits, even in the face of opposition from both Union forces
and local Union collaborators. As a matter of practicality, many
of these would-be runners found south Florida and its island coast
and secluded inlets their most productive base of operation.
By mid-1863, as the blockade of major ports expanded, remote
coastal estuaries such as the Charlotte Harbor system became especially attractive to blockade-runners as bases of operation. Runners
at Charlotte Harbor preferred small, fast-sailing vessels, preferably
with retractable centerboards rather than fixed keels, in order to
access the shallowest of bays and brown waters. In the spring of
1863, the commanding officer of the blockading vessel at Charlotte
Harbor, the James S. Chambers, had received reports from "reliable
sources" that numerous small craft were operating out of the Caloosahatchee River and the Punta Rassa area south of Charlotte Harbor. The report noted that there were many islands and waterways
36.

"Rebel Operations in South Florida," New York Times, December 31, 1861;]. C.
Williamson to Theodorus Bailey, December 29, 1862, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
338.
37. C. H. Rockwell to Gideon Welles, June 11, 1864, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 71617. This discrepancy in prices likely also reflects the rampant inflation of
Confederate scrip as merchants in Cuba or the Bahamas may have demanded
specie and buyers in Florida may only have been able to pay with scrip.
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in the area that afforded blockade-runners the cover to land cargo
unobserved and requested the use of a small craft of light draft, but
· of sufficient size to carry a howitzer, in order to patrol the islands
and interior brown waters that his ship could not access. 38
Admiral Bailey had recently requested authorization from the
Department of the Navy to acquire from the admiralty court at Key
West vessels condemned as prizes of war that would suit the particular nature of the naval conflict in south Florida. He noted in
his report that many of the desirable craft captured running the
blockade were being re-acquired by Confederate interests and put
back into service: "Unfortunately, as the matter is at present managed, interested Confederate agents stand ready to purchase all
the light-draft, swift-sailing vessels when sold under the decree of
condemnation of the court ... to be again used in the evasion of
the blockade." 39 Certainly, it now had become obvious to naval
officers on station that the tactics of blockade-runners were changing and that Federal sea forces needed to adapt accordingly. Intelligence supplied by residents of the area would play a large role in
the changing tactics needed to combat these proliferating wildcat
runners. In the summer of 1863, the EGBS acquired small, lightdraft ships to work in conjunction with the main blockading vessels. The larger ships would be utilized more as a mainspring of
operations for the smaller tenders that would now take the fight to
the Confederates in the shallow coastal and riverine systems. 40
Locally supplied intelligence initiated virtually all riverine
captures of blockade-runners in the Charlotte Harbor-Pine Island
Sound area that appear in the Official Records. In the course of
making a living or foraging for supplies, Union sympathizers and
similar small forces spent more time upriver or in the interior than
the Federal navy did. Their dissatisfaction with Confederate policy,
good relations with Federal crews in the area, and perhaps the lure
of prize money, must have motivated many of them to report sight38.
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ings and to render other forms of assistance. With more eyes and a
greater ease of movement than that of the navy, local Federal sympathizers witnessed Confederate and blockade-running activities
that the blue-water fleet would otherwise have missed. All these
factors contributed to the Union Navy's embracing new tactics
and craft to counter the blockade-runners' brown-water havens.
Also somewhat peculiar to south Florida was the navy's practice
of allowing local Union commanders the freedom to act on their
own initiative to carry out brown-water raids. The flexibility given
to officers, the acquisition of shallow-water vessels, and the steady
source of local intelligence were certainly important factors in
Union successes in this zone of the war.
The USS Rosalie proved to be one of the most effective shallowcrafts stationed in south Florida. A sloop of a mere 28 tons, the
Rosalie was 45 feet long and had a beam of 17 feet, yet its draft was
only 3Y2 feet. It was armed with a single 12-pound smoothbore
cannon. The USS Octorara of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron
had captured it running the blockade on March 16, 1863. Admiral
Bailey petitioned the admiralty court to obtain the Rosalie specifically for blockade duty in south Florida, since it was well suited to
operations in that brown-water environment. Bailey purchased the
sloop for $1,500 in May 1863, and assigned it as tender to the bark
Restless, then blockading Charlotte Harbor. 41
Two collaborators, Henry Thompson and Milledge Brannen,
approached the Restless on July 6, 1863, to report the presence of
two blockade-runners secreted up the Peace River who were preparing to sneak their cotton-laden boats past the blockaders. W. R.
Browne, captain of the Restless, sent thirty-three men in two launches to order the Rosalie to proceed upriver to capture the two runners. With the two local men acting as pilots, the launches made
contact with the Rosalie near the mouth of the riverY
The three small boats then proceeded upriver and spotted the
runners just as the Rosalie ran aground. The blockade-runners,
observing the disabled Rosalie, slipped anchor and moved farther
41.

42.

Statistical Data of Ships, ORN, ser. 2, val. I, 194; United States v. The Sloop Rosalie
and Cargo, Admiralty Final Record Books of the U.S. District Court for the
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upriver. By morning, sailors succeeded in freeing the Rosalie. It continued upriver to capture the runners now ensconced in the shallows
-of Horse Creek. Unoccupied and loaded with cotton, the two runners' ships were the schooner Ann of Nassau and an unnamed sloop.
By means of towing, poling and sailing, seamen moved the vessels to
Punta Gorda, where they anchored for the night. 43
The next morning Browne received the prizes aboard the Restless,
now positioned in Charlotte Harbor. He ordered the Ann to the admiralty court at Key West, where the judge valued it at $195 and its 13
bales of cotton and other cargo at $3,104.40, for a total of $3,299.40.
Court and auction fees of $308.22 left $2,991.18 to be divided as prize
money among the crewmen of the Rosalie and Restless. 44 It is reasonable
to assume that the two local pilots, Thompson and Brannen, also shared
in the prize money, although that is not specified in the court records.
Indeed, financial gain in hardscrabble south Florida, rather than ideology, may have been a little-discussed incentive for refugee informants.
Admiral Bailey subsequently hinted at this factor in his report of the
Rosalie and Restless affair: "Enterprises of this sort, when successfully
accomplished, are of far greater value than the mere amount [prize
payments] of the capture, by disheartening the enemy and encouraging our own men." Within a month of its deployment, the Rosalie,
under Acting Ensign Charles P. Clark, had captured four more vessels in
the Charlotte Harbor area. Bailey thereafter promoted Clark to Acting
Master and the distribution of prize money began anewY
The bark Gem of the Sea relieved the Restless at Charlotte Harbor soon after the capture of the Ann. The Rosalie remained at
Charlotte Harbor, now as the tender for the Gem of the Sea. In
late July 1863, local Union sources of intelligence reported a
small schooner and sloop lying at anchor in the Caloosahatchee
downriver from Fort Myers. The Rosalie captured the two vessels and also secured the Rebel schooner Georgie, which had been
concealed in a small creek near the fort. 46 A few days later, the
Rosalie captured a small boat and three men at Punta Rassa. The
William R. Browne to Theodorus Bailey,July 10, 1863, ORN, ser.l, vol. XVII,
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Ibid.; Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles, July 18, 1863, ORN, ser.l, vol. XVII,
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Theodorus Bailey to William R. Browne,July 18, 1863, ORN, ser.l, vol. XVII,
489; Theodorus Bailey to Gideon Welles,July 18, 1863, ORN, ser.l, vol. XVII,
489-90. On the issue of prize adjudication, see General Order of Acting RearAdmiral Bailey, U.S. Navy,January 1, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 341-43.
Irvin B. Baxter to "Senior Officer," August 10, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII, 527-28.
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three prisoners stated that they were from Manatee and had traveled to the Caloosahatchee for the purpose of evading Confederate conscript officers. Their evasive actions previous to capture
raised suspicions that they were either Confederate spies, blockade-runners, or saboteurs. Henry Thompson, Milledge Brannen,
and another disaffected Confederate named "Cason" were consulted. The three men knew two of the prisoners, William Addison and William Curry. They confirmed that Addison lived in the
vicinity of the Myakka River, owned a large stock farm and about
1,000 head of cattle, and was thus exempt from the Confederate
conscript law. The Union sources stated that Curry had run the
blockade twice and that both men were "traitors to the United
States Government." The ubiquitous Henry Crane, now serving
aboard the Gem of the Sea, vouched for the third man, but because
this captive refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United
States, he was classified as a Rebel as well. Had Union sources
in the area not been present, these "traitors" may well have succeeded in their goals. 47
Shortly after this incident, local Union allies informed Irvin
B. Baxter, commander of the Gem of the Sea, of yet another cottonladen blockade-runner anchored fifteen miles up the Peace River.
Baxter immediately sent a boat and cutter manned by twenty of his
men and piloted by Union refugee Henry West ofUseppa Island to
capture the vessel. The crew appears to have been ready to attempt
a run through the blockade as it was captured at the mouth of the
Peace River rather than secreted upriver. The prize turned out to
be the Richard, a sloop of about 5 tons and loaded with almost 9
bales of cotton. The only remaining crewmember was a black man
who may have seized the moment as an avenue to freedom. 48
In early September, Baxter learned that, in retaliation for the
capture of the Richard, a group of Confederate "regulators" assembled in the vicinity of the Peace River for the purpose of capturing
Union refugees and collaborators and destroying the Rosalie. In
order to preempt the Confederate guerrillas, Baxter sent ashore
party of twenty-one sailors and Union refugee Henry West to intervene. He ordered them to proceed with caution throughout the
area and destroy all boats or contraband they found as well as burn
47.
48.

Ibid.
Irvin B. Baxter to Gideon Welles, September 3, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
545-46.
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the home and storehouse of "the notorious Rebel and blockaderunner [Robert] Johnson." Baxter stated that these buildings were
-sites used as depots for blockade-runners and as councils for guerrillas. The shore party succeeded in destroying four boats, burning Johnson's buildings, and returning to base without casualties.
Baxter commended Henry West for his zeal and reported, "I think
this expedition will have a tendency to break up the blockade running and stop the regulators from coming down here to molest the
refugees in this vicinity." 49
Thereafter, Confederate guerrillas mounted no attack on any
of the refugee camps in Charlotte Harbor, but blockade running
attempts continued. In the fall of 1863, the Rosalie captured the
Rebel schooner Director. The lookout of the Rosalie spotted the
Director "coming out of Terraceia [sic] Creek and making for the
entrance to Sanibel [Caloosahatchee] River" and gave chase. 50
The schooner was loaded with 20 bags of Bahamian salt and 1 barrel of rum. However, the real prize was the capture of the schooner's captain, Robert Johnson, the well-known "notorious Rebel"
and frequent blockade-runner. He had been captured prior to this
incident, once at Philadelphia and once at Key West, and paroled
both times. Useppa Island refugees Wade S. Rigby and Enoch
Daniels informed Baxter that Johnson had broken his parole both
times and was also responsible for the capture of the U.S. supply
schooner Laura in December 1862. 51 Baxter deemed the report
so significant that he sent Johnson in chains to Key West and sent
Rigby there as well to serve as a witness against Johnson. 52 This
time, with the notable assistance of south Florida counter-Confederates, Johnson would not again dupe the Union.
With the consequential arrest and incarceration of Johnson,
a new quiescence swept south Florida waters. Although the hell
of war and its emotions continued to pervade the area, military
records reflect few other major blockade-running efforts and continued substantial alliances between those locals who had gravitat-
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Irvin B. Baxter to Theodorus Bailey, September 5, 1863, ORN, ser. 1, vol. XVII,
547.
Ibid., 562-63; Terra Ceia Creek is located in Manatee County, more than one
day's sail from the Caloosahatchee via the inland passage.
To U.S. authorities, this probably changed Johnson's status from enemy
prisoner of war to a suspected pirate, liable to execution.
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ed to the Union for sundry personal and ideological reasons and
the Union's superior presence along the coast. While certain mili·tary actions erupted periodically-specifically the land actions and
counter-actions over open-range cattle in the area and the Union's
reoccupation of the former Civil War post of Fort Myers-local support and intelligence and superior Federal naval power relegated
south Florida generally to a Union sphere. Florida's war within a
war did rage on, but most of those incidents and actions thereafter
occurred in north and not south Florida. 5 3
Conclusion
Confederate policies created an unusual environment in backwater south Florida by alienating "Union men" and producing
sizable numbers of other dissidents who sought Federal refuge,
cooperation and, at times, even retribution against Southern elements. These local residents, who gravitated to the Union under
various motivations, supplied critical knowledge of the terrain and
both blue- and brown-waterways. They also proved to be useful
Union resources in terms of their familiarity with the sentiments of
other locals, which ensured their value to Federal forces and lent
an unusual "personal factor" to the conflict. Moreover, demoralization of the south Florida populace was often a key aim in Union
efforts because it dulled Rebel zeal to resist. It, moreover, helped
produce an environment in which more Union men, sympathizers, disaffected Confederates, escaped slaves, and other refugees
~rom the burden of war were willing to trust and aid Federal forces,
which in itself resulted in an unexpected Confederate adversary
along south Florida's coastline and adjacent brown waters and
islands. Although not common to the war in north Florida, the
peculiar service of these men added a new dimension to the struggles, strategies, and tactics employed by both Union and Confederate partisans in the lower peninsula.
For their part, Union commanders realized early in the conflict that the presence of such Union men and refugees along the
south Florida coast-including eager black recruits-was a valuable source of manpower and intelligence. Union forces quick-

53.

For more insight into these events, see Irvin D.S. Winsboro, ed. , Florida's Civil
War.
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ly utilized them as a "fifth-column" resource. The recounting of
these events reveals a critical episode in how south Florida and its
inhabitants played an unconventional role during Florida's Civil
War within a war. As historians continue to explore the meaning
and memory of that divisive era, certainly reconceptualization of
peculiar local actions and personal motivations such as those during the course of the troubling conflict in south Florida will lead to
a better understanding of the war itself.
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